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During the last decade, policymakers, economists, and the 
public at large have been engaged in a heated debate over 
U.S. immigration policy. On one side of the debate are those 
who advocate stricter limitations on immigration because, 
even if immigration is beneficial to some, the gain is at the 
expense of others. Most advocates of restrictive immigration 
reform argue that it is the public's obligation to protect the 
interests of low-skilled workers who are hurt by the entry of 
aliens with whom they compete directly for jobs. On the 
other side of the debate are those who argue that immigra 
tion can only be beneficial. By preventing the free flow of 
labor across national boundaries, we have little to gain and 
much to lose.
In all, the immigration debate is multifaceted, with nearly 
as many approaches to the problem, suggestions for reform, 
and arguments buttressing the status quo as there are par 
ticipants in the debate. Both advocates of reform and those 
supporting the status quo make their cases in strikingly dif 
ferent ways. This volume, which collects six papers delivered 
as public lectures at Western Michigan University during the 
1984-1985 academic year, reflects these many views about 
the effects of immigration on the United States economy and 
about reform of the current system.
The objective of most who advocate immigration reform 
is to lower the effective immigration rate the combined
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flow of legal and illegal immigration. To that end, reformers 
emphasize eliminating or at least reducing 
significantly the current flow of illegal immigration. 
Although many policies have been put forward to reduce this 
flow, all essentially fall into one of two categories. On the 
one hand, policies could be implemented that increase the 
personal cost of migrating illegally to the United States. 
Alternatively, the benefits that accrue to undocumented 
workers could be reduced. In either case, fewer would 
choose to incur the costs that accompany migration.
One way of increasing the personal cost of migrating il 
legally would be to devote more resources to patrolling the 
border. Increased surveillance would raise the probability 
that an illegal migrant would be apprehended during cross 
ing. Greater border enforcement may do little to deter the il 
legal immigrant who crosses seldom and remains for a long 
period in the U.S., but would increase significantly the costs 
to the frequent border crosser, and in particular reduce the 
number of commuters who live in Mexico and travel daily to 
jobs in the United States. (As Michael J. Piore argues in this 
volume, however, such a policy may paradoxically increase 
permanent settlement as commuters choose to remain in 
definitely in the U.S. since the probability of gaining entry 
during subsequent crossings is decreased.)
Alternatively, detention of illegal aliens for an extended 
period of time would also cause the personal costs of 
uninspected entry to rise. Currently, an apprehended alien is 
simply returned to his or her country of origin. Thus, the 
pecuniary costs of apprehension are relatively small, con 
sisting of one's earnings foregone during the detention 
period and travel. With an extended detention period, 
however, the pecuniary costs would be greater, rising with 
the length of the detention period. Jagdish N. Bhagwati 
makes a case for detention coupled with the development of
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an economic zone at the border which would provide an 
alternative to entering the United States.
A problem arises with the implementation of policies that 
increase the costs to aliens of illegal entry. The budgets of 
agencies that would be responsible for implementing these 
policies would need to be enlarged significantly. However, 
such an increase is politically difficult to promote, given the 
current need to curb government expenditures. Attention has 
turned instead to reducing the benefits that accrue to illegal 
entrants. For instance, if fines and penalties were imposed 
on employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers, 
illegal aliens would face greater difficulties and a smaller 
probability of finding employment. Hence the returns or 
benefits that accrue to illegal immigrants would fall. 
Presumably the number of undocumented migrants would 
fall along with the reduced incentives to migrate. This was 
the approach of the Simpson-Mazzoli bill passed by the 
House and Senate in 1984 but never signed into law. 1 Subse 
quent attempts at immigration reform have continued to 
focus on the imposition of penalties on employers who hire 
illegal aliens.
The political appeal of reforms that reduce the benefits il 
legal immigrants can expect suggests that the public views 
these policies as less costly than border enforcement policies. 
These perceptions may or may not be true.
How are taxpayers, employers, and consumers affected by 
the two alternative approaches to immigration reform? 
Border enforcement would presumably require a large infu 
sion of tax dollars into the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) to support a larger and more effective force of 
border agents, and to finance the detention of illegal aliens in 
some humane way. Taxpayers, however, would not be 
spared under a system of employer sanctions. It is the con 
sensus of most who favor employer sanctions that they be
4 Many Guises of Reform
implemented hand-in-hand with a system that would allow 
employers to verify the citizenship or immigration status of 
individuals. It is imperative that this verification procedure 
be virtually costless to employers in order to prevent 
discrimination against legal aliens, such as Hispanics, who 
might appear foreign. Hence, if employer sanctions were im 
posed, a verification system would have to be financed 
through the tax system. Either policy, border enforcement or 
employer sanctions, would require large increases in the pool 
of revenues used to implement and enforce federal immigra 
tion law.
A further hidden cost of employer sanctions is noted by 
Barry R. Chiswick in this volume. Chiswick warns that 
employer sanctions are the equivalent of an employer tax, in 
creasing hiring costs. Though intended to reduce the employ 
ment of illegal aliens, this policy would have the additional 
unintended effect of also reducing employment of low- 
skilled native workers.
Ultimately the economic effects of tighter border policy 
and penalties against employers who hire illegal aliens may in 
fact be identical. It may be necessary in either case for firms 
to alter their input mix and to change usually 
decrease their level of output. If, as some argue, there are 
few native workers willing to take the jobs that aliens 
generally hold, then imposing either restrictive policy will 
cause the cost of unskilled labor to rise as the flow of illegal 
aliens is curtailed. It follows that producing any given level 
of output becomes more costly. But if native workers are 
willing to work in jobs often held by aliens, costs are much 
less likely to be affected by a reduced flow of immigrants. 
The point is that it does not matter which of the two ap 
proaches greater border enforcement or employer sanc 
tions is taken. Production costs either rise or do not de 
pending on the availability of domestic low-skilled workers.
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How then do consumers fare under the two alternatives? 
Depending on how the employers' costs respond to fewer 
aliens, consumers will either find prices of goods and services 
rising or remaining unchanged. If adjustments are costly and 
difficult to make if in fact firms find it necessary to alter 
the production methods significantly due to changes in the 
relative prices of inputs the reduced stock of immigrants 
will likely be felt by the consumer as the prices of goods and 
services at least partly reflect higher costs. If the firm's costs 
do not change as a result of a smaller stock of illegal aliens, 
then consumers will not see increases in the prices of goods 
and services. Again, it is unimportant whether the policy im 
plemented is border control or internal enforcement. The ef 
fects on consumers are the same.
Whether in fact consumers are harmed by restrictive im 
migration policy, and whether employers can expect costs to 
increase, depends on whether illegal aliens and domestic 
workers are good substitutes in production. This is an issue 
that has received much attention but on which no consensus 
has been reached. The answer to this question is important 
not only because of the effects of immigration policy on the 
consumer, but because it is important to understand the im 
plications of policy alternatives on domestic workers.
Are native workers harmed or helped by restrictive im 
migration reforms? If native workers and immigrants are 
good substitutes, then natives will be helped by restrictions 
as either their wages rise or their employment opportunities 
improve compared with a more open border policy. If native 
and foreign workers are complements in production then the 
native workers gain from the availability of more foreign 
workers and lose from restrictive immigration policy. If 
some groups of native workers are substitutes for im 
migrants, and others are complementary with immigrants, 
then the impact of immigration restrictions would be
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uneven, and the potential for conflict over reform great. In 
this collection of papers the issue of substitutability is 
discussed in detail by George J. Borjas. Vernon M. Briggs, 
Jr., develops an interesting implication of the debate over 
substitutability by arguing that the current immigration 
policy (or nonpolicy) undermines policy designed to aid 
minorities and the poor.
Although there are direct costs of imposing immigration 
restrictions, many argue that they are smaller than the costs 
that are imposed by the existence of large communities of 
legal and illegal aliens. Immigrants, they argue, participate 
in income maintenance programs and strain public services 
such as education and medical care. In addition, if im 
migrants and natives are substitutes in production, increased 
immigration may cause native workers to earn lower wages 
and suffer more unemployment such that more become eligi 
ble for public assistance. In sum, immigration may impose 
greater costs on U.S. taxpayers than is immediately ap 
parent. Some of these issues are addressed by Francine D. 
Blau, who has analyzed data on the use of transfers by im 
migrants and natives.
The immigration debate is not likely to be concluded in the 
near future. There are too many opposing interest groups, 
too little consensus over what are the important issues, and a 
dearth of evidence that could be drawn upon to resolve these 
differences.
NOTE
1. Differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill could 
not be resolved.
